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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
contingency, the Court rested its decision directly on the Englis case, and held for
intestacy.
It is interesting to note that the air of certainty added to the Fabbri decision
by the presumption against intestacy was entirely dispelled in the later cases. This
suggests that the facts of each case must be a priori sympathetic to the claimant
before the rule has any efficacy.
Date Of Commutation Of Annuity
Testatrix had during her lifetime created an inter vivos trust. She held a
life interest in the profits-with her children designated as the primary bene-
ficiaries. In lieu of a right retained in the trust agreement the settlor created
an annuity in her will for her husband to be paid out of the said trust. The
annuity being a lien on the trust, the beneficiaries contested the validity of the
said annuity and requested that if found valid it be commuted. The validity was
established in a previous decision as was the right to have it commuted. 40
However, this was not until fifteen years after the settlor's death. The Court in
In re Ferris' Trust4' was faced with the question as to the date the annuity should
be computed. Should the annuitant be paid his said annuity for the years up to
the date of the decision of the Court to direct the commutation and at this date
award the computed value, or should the date of the settlor's death be the date
of the computed value? The first alternative means a larger settlement for the-
annuitant because the mortality tables set a later age as the life expectancy as
one becomes older.
The majority of the Court were of the opinion that the date of the settlor's
death should represent the computed value. Unless otherwise provided, an
annunity runs from the date of the death of the testator with the first payment
due at the end of the first twelve-month period.42 The Court reasoned that the
commutation being a substitute for the annuity it should, if possible, be
computed from the same date. To alleviate some of the difference between the
amount he will receive and the amount he would have received if the later date
were used, the Court authorized the maximum interest on the computed value
for the years of litigation.
The dissent's opinion was that the annuitant should receive his annuity for
the years up to the time the Court decides the commutation should take place and
at this time direct the computed value. Their reasoning stems from the idea that
40. Application of Harris, 276 App. Div. 990, 96 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1st Dep't 1950),
afl'd, 302 N.Y. 752, 98 N.E.2d 884 (1951).
41. 3 N.Y.2d 70, 163 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1957).
42. Kearney v. Cruikshank, 117 N.Y. 95, 22 N.E. 580 (1889).
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the annuity was devised to the annuitant and it is not up to the courts to give
to the annuitant any more, or any less, than was designated by the testatrix.
By selecting the earlier date the dissent feels the Court is awarding the annuitant
less than the value of the annunity, as his life expectancy decreases at a lesser
rate than his life increases. They also reason that since it was the beneficiaries
of the trust who brought the action, it should not be the annuitant who suffers
any loss. In support of their argument the dissent cited Dunham v. Deraisme,43
where the date of the computed value was the date the Court awarded the
commutation. In that case the annuitant had been paid fifteen installments of the
annuity before commutation was directed by the Court.44 The Dunham case was
distinguished by the Appellate Division in that the date of commutation was
not specifically litigated. Also, the fifteen payments, if credited to an earlier
computed value, would have left the annuitant with little or no recovery.
With the maximum interest directed by the Court, the Court seems justified
in its result in that it is preventing legal protraction from affecting the final
computed value. If the date was left to the date of the courts decision it can
easily be seen that it would be to the best interest of the annuitant to extend the
litigation as long as possible. This would distract from the efficiency of the
courts and would not be an aid to prompt judicial settlements.
Commissions For Executor's Services
An executor or administrator of a will receives as compensation for his
services, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, certain fixed statutory
commissions paid out of the net income of the estate, and an additional commission
of the value of the estate.45 If an executor is required to manage real property as
part of his services, he is then entitled to an additional commission (6%) on the
gross rentals collected.40 The executor, by a written agreement, may agree to accept
less than the statutory commissions for this service.47
The issue was raised in Estate of Schinasi" whether or not the executor
trustee (a New York City bank) had waived these additional commissions for
the management of realty. The will, which created the testamentary trust, was
silent as to additional fees for the realty management. However, in the inter-
mediate accountings in the Surrogate's Court dating back to 1933, it seemed to
have been assumed by all parties that the wording of the will did not preclude
43. 165 N.Y. 65, 58 N.E. 789 (1900).
44. 286 App. Div. 794, 146 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1st Dep't 1955).
45. N.Y. SURROGATE'S COURT ACr §285(1).
46. Id. §285(6); In re Smathers' Will, 309 N.Y. 487, 131 N.E.2d 896 (1956).
47. In re Hayden's Estate, 172 Misc. 669, 16 N.Y.S.2d (Surr. Ct. 1939), aff'd,
261 App. Div. 900, 26 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1st Dep't 1941), motion for leave to appeal
denied, 285 N.Y. 858, 34 N.E.2d 920 (1941).
48. 3 N.Y.S.2d 22, 163 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1957).
